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I
What do Immanuel Kant and Pablo Picasso have in common? What sounds like the 
beginning of a bad academic joke was a serious question for the Russian philosopher- 
theologian Sergii Bulgakov (1871- 1944). For the affinities between the twentieth- century 
artist and the eighteenth- century philosopher were, for him, substantial. Indeed, read-
ers of Bulgakov’s The Tragedy of Philosophy— recently published in translation by 
Angelico Press— might consider the description of Kant as a ‘cubist’ and of his philoso-
phy as a ‘cubism’, one of the book’s more outlandish and perplexing claims. Nor is it a 
claim that Bulgakov makes only once. In Tragedy, Kant’s epistemology is described as 
‘subjective- cubistic’,1 in response to Kant’s conviction that the unity of perceptions does 
not arise from objects themselves, but is instead imparted by the understanding to ex-
perience.2 Later in the same work, Bulgakov simply inserts the exclamation ‘cubism!’ 
into a citation from Kant’s own text on the unifying role of the understanding. These are 
the only two instances in Tragedy where Kant’s alleged cubism is asserted. They are 
marginal and gnomic assertions, and give an indication of the perplexities that await 
the intrepid reader. But they nonetheless gesture toward the abiding concern of this 
work. For Kant’s ‘cubism’ has to do with his approach to unity, and particularly his 
view of the understanding as imparting unity to experience, rather than the unity of 
things being received by the understanding from the perceived objects themselves.
Bulgakov has more to say on Kant’s ‘cubism’ elsewhere. The characterisation of Kant as 
a cubist pre- dates the extended discussion of the latter’s philosophy in Tragedy by a few 
1 Sergii Bulgakov, Tragedy of Philosophy, trans. Stephen Churchyard (New York: Angelico Press, 2020), 32, 
note 10.
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 134.
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years, first appearing in a 1914 article on the works of Pablo Picasso, published under the 
title ‘The Corpse of Beauty’.3 Here Bulgakov claims that the parallel between Kant and 
Picasso has been noted elsewhere, and he is likely referring to another 1914 article on 
Picasso, this time by Nikolai Berdiaev.4 As for Bulgakov, what is at stake for Berdiaev in 
defining a ‘cubist’ philosophy is its approach to unity, and particularly the unity that both 
Bulgakov and Berdiaev claim for the world independently of reason. Berdiaev understands 
a cubist philosophy as one which sunders the unity of the world: ‘cubism is possible in 
philosophy also. Thus the critical genealogy ends in its latter stages with the slicing up and 
scattering of being’.5 Bulgakov will describe cubism in similar— albeit more graphic— 
terms, as a decomposition of organic, living unity. ‘Putrefaction, the smell of rotting flesh 
and of the disintegrating physical plane are perfectly palpable’ when viewing Picasso’s 
portraits, whilst in cubism as a whole ‘everything, even living things become matter, be-
come composite, die and disintegrate’.6 The artist and the philosopher stand together in 
their sundering of the concrete, living unity of things and in their imposition upon nature 
of the lifeless, abstract unities of the mind: ‘[there is] a growing indifference to the content 
of a painting and a gradual transformation of the art of colour into an art of geometry’.7
But there is one more ‘conceptual character’ who is yet to make their appearance: the 
saint. If in the case of Picasso, the artist is in league with the Kantian philosopher, then by 
disposition the artist possesses an innate affinity with the saint: ‘the artist finds them-
selves in a particularly intimate communion with the soul of the world [. . .] the artist es-
pecially is privy to that limpidity of the flesh which is the attainment of the saints’.8 What 
Bulgakov seems to mean here is that artist and saint are alike characterised by a certain 
way of seeing. Both perceive the coherence, or again, the unity of things. For the ‘limpid-
ity of the flesh’ means the transparency of matter to form or idea: the saint and the artist 
behold the idea that is realised in matter, discern the coherence of matter in its expressing 
this or that particular form. This is what it is to perceive beauty, ‘which is nothing else but 
actualized form’.9 So to perceive the unity of this world is to perceive its unity with the 
world of ideas, or what Bulgakov calls ‘the Divine Wisdom’. The violence of Picasso lies 
in a treatment of his subjects, especially living human bodies, as merely physical. Thus 
considered, they lose their coherence, their life, whence the ‘smell of rotting flesh’.
If the relation between the saint and the artist is ambiguous, then the saint and the 
philosopher tend to be quite straightforwardly opposed. They instantiate two very dif-
ferent modes of knowing, or two very different approaches to unity: ‘the experience of 
the saints qualitatively differs from the wisdom of this world, for in it creation is known 
not from without, but from within, not in the mauvais infini of Kantian experience, but 
with the inner eye in wholeness and unity’.10 So the philosopher seeks to stand apart from 
3 ‘Trup krasoty’ [The Corpse of Beauty], in Sergii Bulgakov, Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh, vol. 2, ed. I. B. 
Rodnianskaia (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 527- 45.
4 Rodnianskaia is the source of this connection. Cf. her notes in Sochineniia, vol. 2, 719.
5 Nikolai Berdiaev, ‘Pikasso’, first published in Sofiia 3 (1914). Available at http://www.picas so- pablo.ru/
libra ry/berdy aev- picas so.html (in Russian). (Accessed 28 September 2020).
6 Bulgakov, ‘Corpse’, 541.
7 Ibid., 542.
8 Ibid., 538.
9 Sergii Bulgakov, The Comforter, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2004), 202.
10 Sergii Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis and Hypostaseity: Scholia to The Unfading Light’, trans. Anastassy Brandon 
Gallaher and Irina Kukota, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 49, no. 1- 2 (2005): 5- 46 (38). Translation modified.
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the world and to know it or impose unity on it from without. The philosopher, Bulgakov 
writes in Tragedy, ‘has wished to create a (logical) world out of himself, out of his own 
principle— “you shall be as gods”’.11 The saint, however, knows the world from within 
and thus is privy to a vision of its proper unity. In this way, the saint is presented in 
Tragedy as capable of a knowledge that surpasses the possibilities of philosophy: ‘why 
not postulate [. . .] an ascent into super- rational realms, realms which, although they are 
not yet accessible to reason, are attainable in principle and are by no means inaccessible, 
according to the testimony of the Christian ascetics?’12
This picture of the ascetic and the philosopher is remarkable in two respects. The first 
concerns the assertion that the saint, unlike the philosopher, is within the world. Is this 
not a contradiction in terms? For surely the ascetic, in their flight from the city to the 
desert, is driven above all by a desire to renounce the world? Indeed, is not the detached 
perspective sought by the philosopher a particular iteration of the ascetic impulse to 
separate oneself from the world? ‘What, then, is the meaning of the ascetic ideal in the 
case of a philosopher? My answer is— you will have guessed it long ago: the philosopher 
sees in it an optimum condition for the highest and boldest spirituality and smiles’.13 The 
trio of artist, philosopher and ascetic had, in fact, been put together before Bulgakov by 
Nietzsche, who likewise considered each as instantiating a particular relation to the 
world. If ascetic ideals mean nothing for artists, since ‘they do not stand nearly inde-
pendently enough in the world and against the world’,14 then the philosopher identifies 
themselves with the saint: ‘they are not unbiased witnesses and judges of the value of the 
ascetic ideal, these philosophers! They think of themselves— what is “the saint” to them!’15
Bulgakov, pace Nietzsche, uncouples the philosopher and the ascetic, in order to align 
the latter with the artist as enjoying a ‘particularly intimate communion with the soul of 
the world’. And this through the affirmation of the body that a properly Christian ascesis 
entails. ‘A metaphysical affirmation of the flesh in its ontological essence, fullness and 
sanctity’ underwrites Christian ascesis, which recognises ‘not only the fullness of the 
flesh but also its individuality, that is, the feeling of the body, my body, which is in some 
sense an inalienable and indestructible aspect of my I’.16 So the ‘intimate communion’ 
of the saint and the artist with the world, a communion that permits a vision of the 
unity of the world with itself and with the divine, is a function of the body and depends 
upon an affirmation of particular embodied existence. Thus, Bulgakov arrives at the 
bewildering conclusion that Picasso’s work, which repeats the Kantian philosopher’s 
rejection of the given, organic unity of the world, expresses a hostility to and denial of 
the full reality of the body: ‘in the work of Picasso one distinctly feels the presence of 
that noumenal sin against the flesh’.17 (Anyone familiar with the photographs of Picasso 
playing, dancing, eating and painting in nothing but shorts in his studio in California 
will be aware of the injustice of this judgement).18 But again, what Bulgakov means by 
11 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 5.
12 Ibid., 7.
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989). Third Essay: ‘What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?’, §7.
14 Ibid., §5.
15 Ibid., §8.
16 Bulgakov, ‘Corpse’, 539.
17 Ibid.
18 Cf. David Douglas Duncan, The Private World of Pablo Picasso (New York: Ridge Press, 1958).
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this is that Picasso does not recognise that the coherence and unity of the body is a func-
tion of its being a spiritual as well as physical reality. On such an account, the denial of 
the former leads to the disintegration of the latter.
The crucial and seemingly paradoxical point is that apprehending the unity of the 
world, which according to Bulgakov is the proper problem of philosophy,19 is incom-
mensurable with the pursuit of a totalising gaze, or ‘view from nowhere’. Rather, and 
this is the second remarkable feature of Bulgakov’s presentation of the saint, knowledge 
of the whole depends upon inhabiting a particular location within it. The ideal of im-
personal, universal knowledge is a contradiction in terms; for knowledge to be knowl-
edge of the whole, it must of necessity also be my knowledge. Bulgakov expresses this 
in Tragedy by saying that we are mistaken when we think that our knowledge is primar-
ily concerned with states of affairs that exist ‘out there’ independently of ourselves, that 
knowledge is fundamentally made up of judgements of the form ‘A is B’. Rather, judge-
ments of the form ‘A is B’ always conceal a more fundamental judgement of the form ‘I 
am A’. Our judgements about states of affairs are in fact as many acts of self- determination, 
or self- expression with respect to the world, such that we are necessarily involved in our 
judgements about the world, no matter how hard we try to suppress that involvement. 
Put in terms familiar to recent discussions of language, the activity of description, for 
Bulgakov, always presupposes the activity of expression.20
We are thus led through seemingly outlandish and marginal comments about Kant’s 
cubism to the fundamental pre- occupation of Bulgakov’s The Tragedy of Philosophy. The 
perceived tragedy of philosophy is that reason is incapable of fulfilling its inherent aspira-
tions: ‘the philosopher cannot but fly; he must ascend into the ether; but his wings inevita-
bly melt in the heat of the sun, and he falls and breaks into fragments’.21 As we have seen, 
the cause of this failure lies in the attempt to know the world from without, when in fact all 
knowledge is necessarily situated. In response to this failure, Bulgakov seeks in Tragedy to 
provide what might be called a theory of integral knowledge,22 an epistemology that be-
gins from the fundamentally personal form of knowledge. This requires a further act of 
integration: that of epistemology and morality. For as the example of the saint shows, the 
way in which we know is dependent on the way in which we live: the saint’s vision of the 
unity of the world is a product of their humility, their willingness to live within the world; 
the failure of the philosopher is a product of their hubris, of a fundamental act of self- 
assertion that Bulgakov will describe as demonic or Luciferian in nature.23 Thus our know-
ing, to once again use terms prevalent in recent discussion, is inseparable from a way of 
life, a habitus that conditions the mode of our access to the world.
Just as Bulgakov’s inscribing of error into the procedures of reason is in keeping with 
Kant’s critical project,24 so too is the method whereby he arrives at his ‘involved’ epis-
19 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 3f.
20 Cf. for example, Charles Taylor’s discussion of the ‘expressive’ function of language in his The Language 
Animal (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2016), 29- 50.
21 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 5.
22 This is the title of a work by Vladimir Solov’ëv, whose influence on Bulgakov in general and on this 
work in particular will be discussed later.
23 This argument runs throughout ‘Corpse’ with reference to Picasso. It also surfaces at several points in 
Tragedy, with reference to Fichte, to whom is ascribed a ‘Luciferian madness’ (53) and to Hegelianism, which 
is described as ‘possessed’ (64).
24 E.g., Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 298/B 354 f.: ‘what we have to do with here is a natural and un-
avoidable illusion [. . .] one that irremediably attaches to human reason, so that even after we have exposed 
the mirage it will still not cease to lead our reason on with false hopes’.
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temology. For he does so by asking about the conditions assumed by reason in its oper-
ations. What assumed conditions underwrite our pursuit of unity? What conditions 
underwrite the failure of philosophical thought in this pursuit? Once again in keeping 
with Kant’s ambitions, the answers found to these questions have both epistemological 
and metaphysical import. However, while Kant will maintain that the conditions of a 
thing’s appearing to us in experience need not hold for the thing in itself, Bulgakov will 
argue that the conditions according to which experience and thought are possible hold 
for the objects of thought and experience. More concretely, the fact that the condition for 
these activities is that they be situated with respect to a personal subject, that thinking 
and experiencing are always someone’s thinking and experiencing, does not condemn us 
to an inescapable anthropomorphism. Rather, it means that personhood must be inher-
ent to the way things are; that metaphysics is necessarily personal; that the unity of 
things is the unity of personal life. And this, for Bulgakov, means that the unity of things 
is necessarily Trinitarian. For the revelation of God as Trinity is also the revelation of 
God as personal and thus also of the personal- cum- Trinitarian nature of the world, 
made in the image and likeness of God. The goal of Tragedy is thus the unification of 
epistemology, morality and ontology, a unification that has its rationale in the Trinitarian 
structure of creation.
This notion that the world is personal because Trinitarian requires further elucida-
tion. As a first step in that elucidation, it is worth noting that in its pre- occupation with 
unity, Tragedy is very much a product of its context. Bulgakov himself said that the mo-
tivation of his intellectual life was ‘characteristic of many Russians: they look for a gen-
eral understanding of life, a Weltanschauung. [. . .] The Russian soul longs for the integrity 
of life’.25 An early review in English likewise pointed out that in its preoccupation with 
unity, Tragedy confirmed the view expressed by Semën Frank that ‘the characteristic of 
Russian philosophy is that it seeks to express the religious and emotional intuition of 
life as a whole’.26 This peculiarly Russian preoccupation with wholeness is concentrated 
in the notion of sobornost’, a word that runs right through Tragedy, together with the 
adjectival form sobornii. The latter is the Slavic translation of ‘catholic’, whilst sobor can 
mean variously a gathering, a council or a cathedral.27 Sobornost’ names the quality of 
being together, of unity- in- plurality that is instantiated in the various meanings of sobor. 
It is primarily an interpersonal unity, but also branches out to name the integrity of the 
created world and also the relation of God with the world. Sobornost’, together with 
‘integral knowledge’ [tsel’noe znanie], are the central concepts in what is known as 
Slavophilism,28 a philosophico- theological tendency that began in the early nineteenth 
century and sought to articulate the distinctive character of Russian or Slavic thought, 
culture and character with respect to the West. Against the individualizing character of 
Western theoretical philosophy and political thought, the Slavophiles argued for a the-
oretical and practical approach that foregrounded relationship and unity. In theoretical 
philosophy, this was expressed in the pursuit of an ‘integral knowledge’, which insisted 
on the pre- eminence of the complexity of the concrete over the abstract. In practical 
25 Sergii Bulgakov, ‘Du marxisme à la sophiologie’, Le messager orthodoxe, 98 (1985): 88- 95 (88).
26 Natalie Duddington, ‘Philosophy in Russia’, Journal of Philosophical Studies 2, no. 8 (1927): 550- 52 (551).
27 Cf. Robert Bird, ‘General Introduction’, in On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader, ed. and trans. by Boris 
Jakim and Robert Bird (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998), 15.
28 These terms are described as ‘like two immortal poems, they express entire worlds in their compact 
energy and unfathomable depth. [. . .] The Slavophiles’ thought is all about sobornost and integral knowl-
edge; these concepts stand at the beginning and end of their writings’. Robert Bird, On Spiritual Unity, 8.
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philosophy, this was expressed especially in the notion of sobornost’, which asserted that 
the individual is a secondary reality, derivative of a primary collective, such that indi-
vidual human fulfilment can only come about through living into that organic, interper-
sonal unity.
Both the theoretical and practical dimensions of this emphasis on unity are devel-
oped in the work of Vladimir Solov’ëv (1853- 1900), a cardinal influence on the genera-
tion of Russian religious philosophers that included Bulgakov. Key terms in Bulgakov’s 
lexicon have their origin in Solov’ëv’s philosophy of unity, such as ‘Divine- Humanity’ 
[bogochelovechestvo] and ‘all- unity’ [vseedinstvo]. More substantially, Solov’ëv’s Lectures 
on Divine Humanity (1878) contain in nuce the interweaving of language, personhood 
and the Trinity that is central to Tragedy. In particular, in the sixth of his lectures, Solov’ëv 
interprets being as having a necessarily propositional structure: ‘if grammatically the 
verb “to be” forms only a link between the subject and the predicate, then logically too, 
being can be conceived only as the relation of an existent to its objective essence’.29 This prop-
ositional structure is attributed above all to God, whose naming of himself as ‘I AM’ to 
Moses invites such an attribution. Moreover, this propositional structure is a threefold 
one (subject- predicate- copula), with Solov’ëv interpreting the constituent elements of 
the proposition in terms of the three ‘modes or positings’ of divine being, or the three 
Persons of the Trinity: ‘it is necessary to assume for these three eternal acts three eternal 
subjects (hypostases). The second of these [. . .] expresses through its own actuality the 
essential content of the first, serving as the eternal expression, or the Word, for the 
first’.30 Finally, this propositional scheme is characteristic also of created personhood 
and so constitutes an imago Trinitatis: ‘the triadic relation of our subject to its content 
corresponds to the relation pointed out above of the absolute subject, or that which ab-
solutely is, to its absolute content’.31
The relationship between this threefold propositional structure and the assertion that 
the essence of God is the all- one or all- unity needs clarification. First, that the essence of 
God must necessarily be all- unity is determined without reference to this propositional 
structure; instead, it follows from the definition of God as absolute: ‘If the divine essence 
were not all- one, if it did not contain the all, then something could be essentially outside 
God. But in that case, God [. . .] would therefore not be absolute’.32 In other words, the 
definition of God as ‘all- unity’ is a function of God as absolute. So how does the defini-
tion of God as absolute relate to the characterisation of divine being as propositional? 
Unity and ‘absolute- ness’ are made especially characteristic of the first positing of divine 
being, i.e., of the divine ‘subject’, the Father: ‘As the absolute principle, God must in-
clude or contain all in Himself in continuous and immediate substantial unity. In this first 
positing, the all is contained in God, that is, in the divine subject or existent . . .’.33 By 
contrast, if the Father ‘expresses absolute unity’, then the second positing, or the Son, 
‘expresses the all, or multiplicity’.34 This is reinforced in the subsequent lecture, where 
Solov’ëv presents each of the divine Persons or ‘modes of being’ as enjoying a 
29 Vladimir Solov’ëv, Lectures on Divine Humanity, ed. and trans. by Boris Jakim (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne 




33 Ibid. My emphasis.
34 Ibid., 81.
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descending proximity to the ‘inner unity’ that is the divine nature: ‘the three modes of 
being [. . .] do not represent the inner unity to the same degree. Clearly, this unity is 
strongest and, so to speak, most inward, most intimate, in will as goodness [i.e., in the 
Person of the Father], for in the act of will, the object of will is not yet separated from the 
subject [. . .]. It remains in an essential unity with it’.35
The propositional, Trinitarian scheme may thus seem superfluous to the definition of 
God as all- unity and as absolute. ‘One may ask: if God, as the first subject, already in-
cludes the absolute content, or the all, what need is there for the other two subjects?’36 
Solov’ëv’s answer is that God’s being absolute is after all dependent upon God’s being 
triune: ‘God as the absolute or unconditioned, cannot be content with having all in 
Himself; He must also have all for Himself and with Himself. Without such fullness of 
existence, Divinity cannot be perfect or absolute’.37 Thus ‘God the Father, by His very 
nature, cannot exist without the Word by Whom He is expressed and without the Spirit 
Who asserts Him’.38 We thus attain some clarity as to the relation between Solov’ëv’s 
definitions of God as the ‘all- one’, as absolute, and as Trinitarian. But with this clarifica-
tion it also becomes apparent that the definition of God as Trinity is deduced ultimately 
from the definition of God as ‘all’. For God to be absolute, God must be Trinity and this 
because only a threefold possession of the all, or the divine nature, is exhaustive. In other 
words, the trinity of Persons is necessitated by the demands of nature. But this is pre-
cisely the kind of understanding of the Trinity that Bulgakov will contest in his more 
mature Trinitarian work.39 There, Bulgakov will argue that one cannot maintain that the 
trinity of hypostases arises as a condition for the exhaustive realisation of the nature. 
Rather, prior to any determination with respect to nature, the tri- unity of persons is in-
herent to personal self- consciousness: the self- consciousness of the I requires the pres-
ence of both a you and a (s)he. Thus with respect to the Trinity, ‘tri- hypostaseity logically 
precedes the definition of individual hypostases in their concrete correlation as Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit’.40 We find the beginnings of this separation of ‘tri- unity’ from the 
demands of nature already in Tragedy, although this argument is not developed as fully 
as in subsequent works.41
Indeed, Bulgakov’s Tragedy of Philosophy is in many ways an extended development 
of this sixth lecture by Solov’ëv. Bulgakov will likewise attribute a propositional struc-





39 For Bulgakov’s critique of Solov’ëv’s deduction of the Trinity from the necessity of nature, see Brandon 
Gallaher, ‘Antinomism, Trinity and the Challenge of Solov’ëvan Pantheism in the Theology of Sergij 
Bulgakov’, Studies in East European Thought 64, no. 3- 4 (2012): 205- 25, esp. 206- 11.
40 ‘Glavy o Troichnosti’ [Chapters on Trinitarity], in S. N. Bulgakov, Trudy o troichnosti, ed. Anna 
Reznichenko (Moscow: O.G.I., 2001), 70. Bulgakov will repeat this in The Comforter, 45: ‘In examining the tri- 
hypostaseity of the Absolute Personality, it must be kept in mind that in itself— in its first positing of itself, so 
to speak— it does not yet include the hypostatic distinctions, but is defined solely by the triune self- positing 
of the I, as I- I- I’. See also ibid., 53- 56. Bulgakov’s most extended treatment of the necessarily threefold nature 
of self- consciousness as I- You- (S)he is in ‘Chapters on Trinitarity’. For an analysis of this text, see Joshua 
Heath, ‘Sergii Bulgakov’s Linguistic Trinity’, Modern Theology (forthcoming).
41 Cf. the discussion of the primacy of the first- person plural ‘we’ over the first- person singular ‘I’ later in 
this article.
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for what truly exists’,42 ‘the structure of the real itself’.43 ‘“Substance” exists not only “in 
itself”, as a subject, but also “for itself”, as a predicate, and, moreover, “in and for itself”, 
in the copula, as existence’.44 This propositional structure of self- consciousness and in-
deed all creation, accessible to reason in reflection, is— as for Solov’ëv— the image of 
God in humanity: ‘If God is Trinity, consubstantial and indivisible, then the human 
spirit, although it is not a trinity, possesses, nevertheless, the form of triunity [. . .] the 
triune nature of the human spirit is living proof of the Holy Trinity’.45 Indeed, the extent 
of Solov’ëv’s influence on this propositional interpretation of the Trinity and Creation is 
palpable in moments of almost direct quotation, as when Bulgakov describes the sub-
ject as ‘a question to which the predicate is the answer’,46 recalling Solov’ëv’s descrip-
tion of the predicate as that which ‘answers the question, what is this subject?’47
Yet Tragedy also presents this propositional- cum- Trinitarian schema in a way that goes 
beyond not only Solov’ëv’s presentation of it, but also Bulgakov’s own elaboration of the 
linguistic basis of reality in his Philosophy of the Name. For in Tragedy, this schema is ‘per-
sonalised’ to a degree that is novel even for Bulgakov. In both Solov’ëv’s Lectures and 
Bulgakov’s Philosophy, the subject of the ontological proposition can be as much a per-
sonal as an impersonal entity. This is clear in Solov’ëv when he argues that the ‘triunity 
of God is wholly unfathomable to reason’ because of the propositional structure of 
being. This unfathomability is not unique to God; instead, ‘the life of any creature whatever 
is unfathomable, for no entity is, as such, exhausted by its formal objective aspect’.48 
That is to say that every being has an ‘inner, subjective aspect’ that transcends what can 
be known in its manifestations, or its predicate, and this means that ‘Divinity in heaven 
and the least blade of grass on earth are equally unfathomable, and equally fathomable, for 
reason’.49 The important point here is that the propositional schema— and the ensuing 
transcendence of being to reason— obtains equally for impersonal entities (a blade of 
grass) as for created and indeed divine persons. The ‘subject’ is therefore not necessarily 
a centre of self- consciousness, an I; it can be a who or a what. The same is true of the prop-
osition and the subject as they are presented in Bulgakov’s Philosophy of the Name. 
Certainly, Bulgakov maintains there as in Tragedy that the first- person singular I, the 
personal pronoun, is the subject par excellence: ‘The I is in a certain sense the root of lan-
guage [. . .] the I is the point of orientation of being, thought and language’.50 However, 
impersonal as well as personal beings are described elsewhere in the same work as equal 
ontological centres, gestured to in a given proposition. In the phrase ‘the king sent an 
order to the commander’, Bulgakov asks ‘who is being spoken about here?’ ‘The king? 
But also the commander and the order. These ontological centres are brought into mutual 
relation’,51 with the order as much an ‘ontological centre’, it would seem, as the king and 
the commander. The propositional schema obtains for all entities, and both personal and 
impersonal pronouns ‘gesture’ toward equally transcendent essences: ‘when a person 





47 Solov’ëv, Lectures, 77.
48 Ibid., 92. My emphasis.
49 Ibid., 93. My emphasis.
50 Filosofiia Imeni [Philosophy of the Name], in Sergii Bulgakov, Pervoobraz i Obraz, ed. I. B. Rodnianskaya 
(Moscow and Saint Petersburg: Iskusstvo/Inapress, 1999), vol. 2, 49.
51 Ibid., 52.
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sees a snake and calls it a “snake”, they essentially fulfil the function of endowing mute 
being that is beyond meaning with meaning and saying: this is snakelike, is a snake’.52 
The fundamental form of the proposition is not ‘I am A’, but ‘A is B’, with the first- 
person pronoun being one candidate for A alongside impersonal pronouns.
In The Tragedy of Philosophy, Bulgakov thoroughly works through the implications of 
the statement that ‘the I is the point of orientation of being, thought and language’. 
Whereas in Philosophy, propositions of the kind ‘I am A’ were ultimately instances of the 
more general form ‘A is B’, their priority is reversed in Tragedy: ‘there arises the question 
whether all judgements of the type A is B, in all its modalities, can fairly be reduced to 
the type I am A. [. . .] The epistemologically (and anthropologically) prior and typical 
form is, without doubt, I am A’.53 Following this general statement of priority, Bulgakov 
analyses what is going on in a judgement of the ‘A is B’ kind (‘this table is black’) in a 
way that bears little resemblance to the quasi- Platonic analysis of such judgements in 
Philosophy. The ‘independent subjects’ of such propositions (i.e., ‘this table’) do indeed 
bestow ‘a likeness of hypostaticity’ upon the proposition. However, this likeness is in 
turn bestowed by the subject of the utterance: it is ‘incessantly created by our I in innu-
merable, mirroring repetitions’.54 In Philosophy, such a judgement would be held to con-
ceal a more fundamental judgement of the form ‘this is a table’, whose proper subject 
would be the mysterious ‘ontological centre’ gestured to by the demonstrative pro-
noun. Now it is read as abbreviating a judgement whose proper subject is the I: ‘I see, 
think, sense that this table is black’.55 Thus, although we ascribe predicates to an imper-
sonal ‘subject’, such as a table, anthropomorphically, ‘in the image and likeness’ of the I in 
its relation to its predicate or self- revelation, this is not the same as saying that such 
‘subjects’ are indeed centres of self- revelation, as in Philosophy. Rather, it is a statement 
of the fact that we are fundamentally oriented toward relations of the subject- subject, 
rather than subject- object, variety. Sadly, this point is somewhat obscured by the inaccu-
racy of the recent translation.56 There, Bulgakov is translated as follows:
I see, I think, I sense this black table. This judgement succinctly expresses the being 
of the table in itself and, like the I, for itself: this table is black.57
One may be led to think, on the basis of the translation, that the table does possess a form of 
being akin to that of personal subjects, i.e., as a centre of self- revelation. However, Bulgakov’s 
point is not that the being of the table is succinctly expressed in the judgement. Rather, his point 
is that the full judgement (‘I perceive that the table is black’) is what is abbreviated by speaking 
about the table as if it were a self- standing, independent subject. The translation ought to read:
I see, think, perceive that this table is black. This judgement is expressed in abbre-
viated form in the assertion of the being of the table in and for itself, in the likeness 
of the I: this table is black.58
52 Ibid., 54.
53 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 16.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. Translation modified.
56 I will discuss in greater detail some of the problems of this translation in the next section.
57 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 16.
58 This translation is my own, from Sergii Bulgakov, Tragediia Filosofii, in idem, Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh, 
vol. 1, ed. S. S. Khoruzhii (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 324.
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What all of this means is that a judgement like ‘this table is black’ is primarily an act of 
revelation on the part of the judging subject: ‘every judgement of objective content can be 
considered as a predicate of the I, as its self- definition’.59 Bulgakov maintained in The 
Philosophy of the Name that each name represents the self- disclosure or self- naming of im-
personal entities ‘out there’: ‘the name, the phenomenon is the revelation of the thing, the 
noumenon [. . .] the thing goes out of itself and becomes a cosmic thing’.60 In Tragedy whilst 
the notion that the world reveals itself in language is very much present, the focus is much 
more on the revelation of the speaking subject in the names they give and the judgements 
they make about the world around them: ‘the source of thought, in any case, is not here in 
these object- subjects, but in the underlying formula: I am something’.61
By making objective propositions into moments in a single, continuously developing 
proposition (the life of a personal subject, ‘I am A’) Bulgakov takes a decisive step in the 
generalisation of the Trinitarian, propositional schema. For what he achieves is to unify 
self and world within a single proposition or movement of self- disclosure. Although in 
Philosophy, Bulgakov was at pains to stress the unity of self and world, as the latter 
names itself through the former, this unity is nonetheless elusive. The world constitutes 
a totality of self- disclosures or unfolding propositions, each with its own mysterious 
subject. Although each of these self- disclosures requires the involvement of human 
speakers, they nonetheless seem to stand alongside the speaker’s own self- disclosure or 
life. Indeed, there is a sense in which the epistemological model proposed in Philosophy 
remains that of an observer. For the Trinitarian shape of creation unfolds before us in the 
propositional life of impersonal creatures, in which the pronoun is ‘the first hypostasis 
of being, in which is generated the second hypostasis, the word, and which, perceiving 
its bond with this verbal expression [. . .] accomplishes its third hypostasis. It stands to 
reason that this eternal generation of the world, the imprint of trihypostaseity that lies 
upon the whole of creation, also defines the nature of speech’.62 The extent to which the 
unity of self and world is asserted in The Philosophy of the Name without being satisfacto-
rily grounded is betrayed by this ambiguity concerning the relationship between the 
process by which the world names itself and speakers name themselves, between the 
life of the world and the life of humanity.
In Tragedy, the Trinitarian and propositional structure of creation is not something 
that can be observed independently of the subject. Rather, it becomes accessible only 
through self- reflection and so with the acknowledgement that the subject occupies a 
place within that structure; that the life of the world and the life of the personal subject 
together form one triune life. Here my earlier assertion— that Bulgakov’s project in-
volves an interweaving of epistemology and morality, and that it entails a re- 
interpretation of ascesis as being within the world— becomes clearer. For intellectual 
effort, which entails interpreting objective judgements like ‘the table is black’, as in fact 
predicates of a more fundamental judgement of the form ‘I am A’, is inseparable from 
the moral, ascetic effort of renouncing the God’s- eye- view that characterises philoso-
phy. With this effort, the true object of knowledge comes into view. In The Philosophy of 
the Name, the argument was that, contra Kant, we can know essences or noumena, be-
cause the proposition attests to the continuity between a thing and its manifestations. 
59 Tragedy, 16. Translation modified.
60 Bulgakov, Philosophy of the Name, 61.
61 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 16. Translation modified.
62 Bulgakov, Philosophy of the Name, 50.
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But the object of knowledge remains such things- in- themselves out there. In Tragedy, the 
‘thing- in- itself’ is what is redefined: ‘the I, the hypostasis, is truly the thing in itself, the 
noumenon’,63 the transcendent object of knowledge that is made accessible in its mani-
festations: ‘the transcendent is always also inseparably linked to the immanent; the 
transcendent becomes immanent. The subject, the hypostasis, always reveals itself, al-
ways expresses itself, in the predicate’.64 That which we come to know in scrutinising 
our judgements about the world is in fact the self, the I that makes those judgements.
But what does this mean? How can the judgement ‘the table is black’ be meaningfully 
understood as disclosive of the self? To answer this, it is worth asking whether we can say 
any more about the transcendence of the personal subject. This transcendence is occasion-
ally presented in Tragedy in terms of ‘hidden depths’ and of ‘self- enclosure’; the transcen-
dent subject is a ‘realm hitherto unknown to light’.65 All of this suggests an understanding 
of the subject as transcendent by virtue of an inaccessible, private quantum that is exter-
nalised in the predicate: ‘the self- enclosed I finds itself on an island inaccessible to any 
kind of thinking or being, but discovers within itself a certain image of being’.66 The prob-
lems with such a presentation of transcendence are not difficult to articulate with respect 
to Bulgakov’s project in Tragedy, not least because it threatens to re- instate the priority of 
an allegedly private self over relation with the world. But Bulgakov has more to say else-
where in Tragedy, where the transcendental subject is shown to be a plurality, a we, rather 
than a monadic I: ‘as soon as we attempt to think or to perceive the I as a unity, without 
any you [. . .] the I becomes unintelligible’.67 Bulgakov argues that this is implicit not only 
in Kant’s moral philosophy, in the universality of the Categorical Imperative, but also in 
Kant’s epistemology, which makes universality a criterion for truth. Such universal sig-
nification is only possible on the condition of intersubjective unity: ‘judgement, precisely 
in its nature as universal and universally signifying, is a silent yet expressive gesture to-
wards the we, is the site of the we’.68 Insofar as such a unity is assumed by thought and 
speech in their universal scope, ‘the plurality of the I is a fundamental axiom of thought 
and life’.69 The transcendent subject is thus not merely an I, but a we.
Further, we can say that what is ‘hidden’ in the subject, that which lies ‘beyond’ the 
predicate, is not a mysterious quantum. Rather the subject’s ‘noumenal quality’ is the act 
of the subject’s ‘self- positing’ in relation to other subjects: ‘the nature of the hypostasis 
in relation to conciliarity [sobornost’], its position and self- perception within the all- 
unity [vseedinstvo], as a supertemporal act lying at the very boundary of creation’.70 So 
we must read propositions of the form ‘A is B’ as abbreviated forms of a more funda-
mental self- determination ‘I am A’, which is in turn an expression of the love (or lack 
thereof) of the subject for others. An important qualification to make here is that 
Bulgakov is not concerned with love as an affective state. Rather, he understands love 
to be the way in which our ‘pre- conscious’ positioning of ourselves in the world in-
volves others. It is a mode of knowledge proper to subject- subject relationships and is 
determinative of the quality of our knowledge about the world:
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There is a special way for the subject to know a subject, but not an object: this way 
out of one’s self is not through one’s own nature, but from self to self, that is, to a 
you. And the only organ of such cognition [. . .] is this exit from the self through 
which I know myself as another. This is love . . .71
What is disclosed in one’s judgements about the world, in the unity that one makes out 
of the world, is the unity that the judging subject makes (or does not make) with others. 
Insofar as one’s selfhood is an act of self- assertion, and thus a denial of the true, collective 
constitution of self- consciousness, our stance toward and cognition about the world will 
likewise be characterised by subjectivity and falsehood. To the extent that our selfhood is 
an act of love, an affirmation of the truth of personhood, our knowledge of the world will 
also be true: ‘To free oneself from subjectivity— this means to be a conciliar (that is, a true) 
I, to be in the truth and therefore to know it. This means to be a true subject, who does not 
deface his or her own predicate, but leaves it free to reveal itself’.72 The unity of the world 
as love, as ‘all- unity’ [vseedinstvo] can only be known from within and as the manifestation 
of interpersonal unity- in- love, in a coincidence of sobornost’ and integral knowledge 
[tsel’noe znanie].73 This conditioning of knowledge by love is what makes Bulgakov’s inte-
gration of ontology, morality and epistemology a distinctively Trinitarian project. For if 
creation is in the image of the Trinity, whose pre- eminent name is Love, then the world as 
love or ‘all- unity’ (ontology) can only be known (epistemology) by subjects who are them-
selves determined in love, rather than by self- assertion (morality).
To this extent, knowledge is not an indifferent registering of states of affairs ‘out 
there’. Rather, it is a creative labour, which has as its goal not only the realisation of the 
unity of the world with itself and with the subject, but also of subjects with one another 
as one, interpersonal subject. All creation thus comes to form a single life, a single triune 
proposition. As such an integral image of the Trinity, the whole creation manifests its 
unity with the creator also, a unity which is the privileged vision of the saints: ‘to the 
illumined eye of the ascetic the world presents itself as the living riza of the Godhead, 
as his Word, clothed in the Holy Spirit’.74 What The Tragedy of Philosophy thus presents— 
beneath the density of its engagements with the pantheon of German Idealism— is a 
vision of intellectual endeavour as inseparable from the wider human vocation to real-
ise the life of God in the world. For thought too is the arena for that dispossession to 
which all Christians are called, and which is enjoined with a promise: ‘those who lose 
their life for my sake will find it’.
II
Anyone undertaking a translation of Sergii Bulgakov’s work should be applauded. He 
is a difficult writer: hermetic in style, prone to paragraph- long sentences and page- long 
paragraphs, and fond of word play, liturgical citation and poetic allusion. All this be-
sides the straightforward lack of equivalents in English for certain words and phrases 
in Russian. An important example of the latter in Tragedy is Bulgakov’s frequent use of 
71 Ibid., 114.
72 Ibid., 115.
73 There are clear affinities at this point with another of Bulgakov’s major influences, namely the work of 
Pavel Florenskii, whose Pillar and Ground of the Truth has as its epigraph ‘Knowledge becomes love’ (Gregory 
of Nyssa). Crucially, what Bulgakov is proposing is the reverse: love becomes knowledge.
74 Bulgakov, Hypostasis and Hypostaseity, 38.
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two alternatives for what in English is covered simply by ‘subject’: there is the loanword 
‘sub’ekt’ that tends to refer to the ‘subject’ understood in a broad, philosophical sense; 
and there is ‘podlezhashchee’, a calque (‘pod- ‘ meaning ‘under’ and ‘lezhashchee’ 
meaning ‘lying’) that is usually restricted to the grammatical subject. These are trans-
lated as ‘philosophical subject’ and ‘grammatical subject’ respectively, a choice that is 
understandable and indeed necessary, although it also necessarily rarefies a distinction 
that Bulgakov is actually blurring throughout the work. Such are the difficulties with 
which any translation from Russian into English must contend, and Churchyard’s 
translation ought to be commended for where it is lucid and faithful to the original. 
However, its readability conceals the fact that the translation suffers in several respects: 
there is a tendency toward over- clarification and supplementation; mis- translations of 
admittedly complex sentences are not infrequent and are occasionally major; mis- 
translations of individual words are also not infrequent, and it is unclear whether these 
are due to misunderstanding or a missing round of proof- reading.75 All of these further 
attest to a misunderstanding of crucial elements of Bulgakov’s text, which are necessar-
ily passed on to the reader and which are evident in ways other than straightforward 
problems of translation.
The decision to translate the second- person singular Russian pronoun ‘ty’ with the 
archaic and formal English ‘thou’ is the most obvious instance of unnecessary distor-
tion, despite the plausible objection that English has only ‘you’ for both the second- 
person singular and the second- person plural. The formal second- person pronoun is a 
foreign import into Russian: the custom of using the second- person plural ‘vy’ in ad-
dressing one’s superiors and those with whom one is unfamiliar is a relatively late 
phenomenon that has its immediate predecessor in the corresponding tendency in 
French, and was introduced by Peter the Great together with the Table of Ranks.76 It is 
absent from the Russian Orthodox liturgy, where God, angels and saints are all ad-
dressed in the same second- personal singular ‘ty’ as is used for one’s family, friends etc. 
To the Russianist, the use of ‘thou’ thus jars,77 especially as one of Bulgakov’s most 
rapturous passages at the end of Tragedy concerns God’s entry into human affairs as an 
interlocutor, who is ‘you’ and who says ‘you’ to human beings. Indeed, what Walter 
Kaufmann writes apropos of Buber’s Ich und Du [I and You] is relevant here: ‘Thou im-
mediately brings to mind God; Du [You] does not. And the God of whom it makes us 
think is not the God to whom one might cry out in gratitude, despair, or agony, not the 
75 Two minor examples of this, the first grammatical and the other lexical. Churchyard has Bulgakov ad-
vocating ‘a singular empiricism, freed from the narrow and vulgar idea of empiricism, and capturing living 
and mystical experience in all its depth’ (6). But ‘capturing’ is in fact a present passive participle in the Russian 
original, not active, such that the translation ought to read: ‘A singular empiricism, freed from the narrow and 
vulgar idea of empiricism, and instead taken [i.e., understood] according to all the depth of living and mysti-
cal experience’.
For the second example, which is found on the same page, Churchyard’s Bulgakov asserts that ‘the world, 
actuality, is not a single, purely rational being’ (6). But what Churchyard has translated as ‘single’, oднo 
тoлькo, in fact means ‘merely’ or ‘simply’, and thus the translation ought to read: ‘the world, actuality, is not 
merely rational being’ or ‘is not rational being alone’. These may seem like minor examples, although the dis-
tortion of meaning is significant. But more importantly, these errors on the level of individual words are met 
with more substantial errors on the level of whole sentences or sentence- sequences.
76 I thank Natasha Franklin for her memorable first- year undergraduate lectures on Russian grammar, so 
memorable that the discussion of the second- person pronouns remains clear in my mind.
77 It is therefore regrettable that the same use of ‘thou’ is found in Boris Jakim’s translations of Bulgakov, 
as in The Comforter: ‘all of these three hypostatic centres of the one I are equivalent or equi- hypostatic as I- 
thou- he’ (45).
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God to whom one complains and prays spontaneously: it is the God of the pulpits, the 
God of the holy tone’.78 The miracle of intimacy that so delights Bulgakov is obscured 
when God is ‘thou’ and made simply bizarre when God in turn addresses human be-
ings as ‘thou’: ‘The fact that God says thou to human beings [. . .] and the fact that he 
gives to the human being, to created being, the power to approach God as Thou, that is, 
He accepts a creature into the Divine We, this is a miracle of God’s charity’.79 This Divine 
We becomes a peculiarly English one, in which even Father and Son presumably ad-
dress one another with a respectable Thou. And Bulgakov too addresses his readers as 
‘thou’, making an otherwise unremarkable passage in the original into a moment of 
inappropriately theatrical apostrophe: ‘by virtue of that love with which thou lovest, 
thou naturally affirmest [!] thy own I . . .’.80 In the same prologue to Ich und Du, Kaufmann 
is clear that the translation of Du as ‘thou’ distorts Buber’s intention: ‘suppose a man 
wrote a book about direct relationships and tried to get away from the formulas of theo-
logians and philosophers: a theologian would translate it and turn Ich und Du into I and 
Thou’.81 The irony of the present case is that the translator has turned out to be more a 
‘theologian’ than Bulgakov, who clearly has little interest in the ‘God of the holy tone’.
The fact that the consistent choice of ‘thou’ rather than ‘you’ is indeed a choice makes 
it all the more perplexing that it is not addressed and justified in the translator’s intro-
duction. Indeed, it is puzzling that the translator felt it necessary to ‘pass over the only 
partly soluble difficulties presented by such terms as sobornij, sushchij and obraz’.82 
Where else, barring a translator’s introduction, should such difficulties be addressed, 
especially as we already have a lucid and comprehensive theological foreword from 
John Milbank? While it is often frustrating when a reviewer criticises a text for what it 
does not say, part of the translator’s task is to guide the reader into the resonances of 
words in the original that are inevitably lacking in the translated equivalents. Such is 
the situation with a word (and concept) like sobornost’, which, as we have seen, was 
central to the nineteenth- and twentieth- century Russian intellectual tradition. This his-
tory, which embraces the work of Khomiakov, Dostoevskii and Solov’ëv, to name a few, 
is at play in Bulgakov’s use and development of the concept of sobornost’ in Tragedy and 
informs the ambition of the whole work. To simply translate it with the unwieldly ‘con-
ciliarity’ and without any discussion of this context means that readers will be unaware 
of how Bulgakov, in developing at such length the concept of sobornost’, is situating his 
work and making a decisive contribution within the tradition of Russian religious 
thought. And this situation is surely crucial if we are to understand what Bulgakov is 
trying to do.
Turning to more straightforward instances of misunderstanding, let us take, first, this 
passage from the translation:
The life of the human spirit is a continuously self- developing and self- accomplishing 
judgement: I am something, a certain A. More precisely, it is necessary to express 
the sequence of judgements thus: I am something, I – am – A.83
78 ‘I and You: A Prologue’, in Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1970), 14.
79 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 154.
80 Ibid., 114.
81 Buber, I and Thou, 15.
82 Stephen Churchyard, ‘On the Idea of a Christian Materialism’, in Tragedy, lvii f.
83 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 93.
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On the basis of the translation, one would be inclined to think that the ‘sequence’ under 
discussion is the sequence from one kind of judgement, ‘I am something’, to another kind, 
‘I – am – A’. For Bulgakov is— it seems— speaking about the order of ‘judgements’ plural, 
whilst the translator’s decision to retain the fourfold typographic variation of the first- 
person pronoun I in the original (in italics, upper- and lower- case, and in roman, upper- 
and lower- case), by introducing a bold- type I, furthers this sense that we are dealing with 
two distinct kinds of proposition here. Perhaps this sequence is a movement from the in-
determinate ‘something’ of the first judgement to the determinate ‘A’ of the second. It 
is unclear. But compare Churchyard’s translation with the translation below of the same 
passage:
The life of the human spirit is a continuously self- developing and self- accomplishing 
judgement: I am something, a certain A. It is necessary to express the order of the 
judgement more precisely, in the following way: I something am, I A am.84
Reading the above, it is clear that the ‘order’ or ‘sequence’ in which Bulgakov is inter-
ested is not between forms of judgement, but rather between the constituent parts of any 
given judgement. The point Bulgakov is making is that the predicate, which usually comes 
third and last in a proposition, ought to come second, changing places with the copula, a 
change which is absent from the published translation. Why is this important? Because of 
Bulgakov’s Trinitarian interpretation of a proposition’s structure, according to which the 
subject stands as the first hypostasis, the Father, while the predicate stands as the second 
hypostasis, the Son or Word, and the copula stands as the third hypostasis, the Spirit. The 
translation misses this entirely, introducing instead a distinction between kinds of judge-
ment that does not exist in the original. How? First, by mis- translating a genitive singular 
[of the/a judgement] as a plural [of judgements]; second, by reproducing the aforemen-
tioned typographical variation in the first- person singular pronoun, even though the edi-
tor of the Russian edition rightly asserts that ‘the choice between the four possible ways of 
writing I, one of the central concepts of the book, is entirely variable and only in some cases 
subject to a discernible logic’.85 While it is understandable that the translation reproduces 
the latter, typographic ambiguity, the transformation of this ambiguity into misunder-
standing is not. The translator’s assurance that ‘readers need not become over- anxious 
about the distinctions involved [in the various forms of I], since, happily, these are usually 
clear from the context’,86 turns out to be ironic.
There are two more significant instances of mistranslation on which I would like to 
dwell, owing to their bearing on what has already been said about the transcendence of 
the subject, on the one hand, and about love as a mode of knowing, on the other. It will 
become clear that the translation unfortunately has Bulgakov saying the exact opposite 
of what he wishes to say on these points. Turning to the first, there is the following im-
portant discussion of the peculiar transcendence of the personal subject, the hypostasis 
or the I, rendered in the translation as follows:
This hypostasis is beyond the bounds of thought, and, as fully transcendent to 
thought, is a zero for it; whatever is perfectly and completely transcendent to 
84 Tragediia, 391. Translation my own.
85 Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh, vol. 1, 571.
86 ‘On the Idea of a Christian Materialism’, lviii.
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thought, that is, simply does not exist for thought. Yet such a transcendence is noth-
ing other than a mathematical limit, which it is never possible for thought to make 
real, and the Ding an sich, the thing in itself is still τὸ νωύμενον, the intelligible.87
So the transcendence of subject to predicate is identified with the transcendence of a 
mathematical limit; the hypostasis is made a zero for thought. But such a reading of 
Bulgakov forces him to contradict himself both between texts and, more jarringly, within 
Tragedy itself and even within the passage just quoted. For how can Bulgakov assert that 
the transcendence of the subject is that of ‘a mathematical limit, which it is never possible 
for thought to make real’, yet then insist on the ‘intelligibility’ or ‘thinkability’ of the I? The 
contradiction is explicit when this passage is compared to another in the following chapter, 
where Bulgakov writes that ‘the noumenon [that is, the I] does not possess being in the 
world of phenomena, yet, at the same time, it is not a zero, for existence, if not being, belongs 
to it [. . .] Thus the Ding an sich turns out to be not merely a limit concept’.88 Whilst it is true 
to say that Bulgakov insists throughout this work on the inherent contradictions of created 
subjectivity, it simply cannot be the case that Bulgakov simultaneously maintains in Tragedy 
that the subject is and is not ‘a zero’, that it does and does not possess existence.
The problem is that the translation turns a contrast between the transcendence- in- 
immanence of the personal subject and the unthinkable, fictitious transcendence of the 
mathematical limit or zero, into an identification. What are two contrasting conceptions 
of transcendence in the original become one in the translation. Indeed, this is precisely 
the contrast we find at the beginning to the Epilogue of The Comforter. There, Bulgakov 
asks whether the Father, the ‘subject’ within the Trinity, is not ‘a pure zero, incapable of 
being grasped . . .?’89 Note the textual echoes between this passage and the one under 
discussion. But Bulgakov’s point is that such an account of transcendence cannot apply 
to the Father, i.e., to the very hypostasis to which Churchyard attributes the transcen-
dence of a zero. Returning to the original passage in the light of the above, a more pre-
cise translation would read as follows:
Only that which is fully and altogether transcendent is beyond thought, and as 
fully transcendent to it, is a zero for thought, i.e., it does not exist at all. But such a 
transcendence is nothing more than a mathematical limit, never to be realised in 
thought, while the Ding an sich, the thing in itself, is nonetheless to noumenon, the 
intelligible.90
Articulating a distinctive sense of the transcendence of the personal subject to their 
manifestations is an abiding pre- occupation of Bulgakov’s personalist philosophy and 
Trinitarian theology, being bound up with his efforts to articulate the place of the Divine 
Wisdom within the Trinity, on the one hand, and also his efforts to develop an account of 
87 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 13.
88 Ibid., 37. Translation modified.
89 Bulgakov, The Comforter, 359.
90 Tragediia, 321. Translation my own. The problem here is a grammatical misunderstanding. This sentence 
is structured in the original by an extended ‘that . . . which’, or ‘тo . . . чтo’, construction, with the two correlat-
ing elements separated by several clauses. Rather than correlating the two, Churchyard has instead translated 
the ‘that’ or ‘тo’ as referring to the ‘hypostasis’ of the previous sentence. But this is not grammatically justifi-
able, for ‘hypostasis’ is feminine in Russian, whereas ‘тo’ is a neuter form.
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the monarchy of the Father that does not lapse into subordinationism, on the other. The 
account of transcendence which we find in Tragedy is a decisive moment in that project of 
articulation. For it to be mistranslated in this way means that readers risk misunderstand-
ing Bulgakov on one of the most important points in his thought.
This brings us to the final passage to be considered. The foregoing discussion has set 
out Bulgakov’s understanding of the subject’s involvement in what they know. Acts of 
thinking are, like all other personal activities, acts of self- expression. They express the 
‘noumenal’ quality of the subject. This ‘noumenal’ aspect has been further clarified as 
the quality of the subject’s self- positing with respect to other subjects. Our thinking and 
knowing, as acts of self- manifestation, are conditioned by the degree to which our self-
hood is an act of self- assertion, in which the subject affirms themselves against other 
subjects, or an act of love: ‘insofar as truthfulness is defined from the side of the subject, 
its attainment is linked precisely to the condition of the hypostasis, whether it is closed 
off in egotistical mono- hypostaseity, or instead expanding within a collective, hypo-
static plural unity that is inspired by love for the truth’.91
It simply cannot make sense, therefore, to oppose love and epistemology. But this is 
what the translation does:
We said that the comprehension of conciliarity [sobornost’] in the I was accom-
plished through love and in love, and the epistemology of the subject is comprised 
of its opposite, self- love, which has many manifestations.92
Punctuation and syntax do make the original unclear. But the plain fact that Bulgakov 
insists on the following page that a ‘denial of love’ ‘devalues and weakens knowledge’ 
should be enough to rule out the juxtaposition of love and epistemology that Churchyard 
introduces. A careful parsing out of the passage yields the following translation, which is 
both in keeping with the grammar of the text and the meaning of the work:
We said that the understanding of conciliarity [sobornost’] in the I is accomplished 
through love: the epistemology of the subject consists in love and its opposite, self- 
love – which has many different manifestations, from coldness to hostility and 
hatred.93
Do these and other such moments of misunderstanding result in an irredeemable dis-
tortion of Bulgakov’s original text? The answer is no. Lucidity and fidelity to the original 
are not hard to find, although as the foregoing discussion indicates, they are not as 
91 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 116. Translation modified. Indeed, the translation of this sentence is also unnecessar-
ily problematic, with a number of relationships that are grammatically unambiguous in the original becoming 
ambiguous in translation. In Churchyard’s version, the ‘hypostasis’ is ‘impelled by love towards the truth as 
a hypostatic plural unity’, with it being unclear whether truth is this ‘hypostatic plural unity’. But the original 
makes clear both that ‘impelled’ is not the complement of ‘hypostasis’ and that ‘truth’ is not correlated with 
‘hypostatic plural unity’. Both ‘plural unity’ and ‘impelled [by love]’ are in the prepositional case, whereas 
‘hypostasis’ is not, meaning that the ‘plural unity’ [i.e., humanity or the Church] is ‘impelled [by love]’, not 
the isolated ‘hypostasis’. Meanwhile ‘truth’ is in the dative because it is the complement of ‘love for the truth’, 
whilst ‘plural unity’ is in the prepositional because it is the complement of ‘expanding within a collective, 
hypostatic plural unity’, meaning that ‘truth’ cannot be identified ‘as a hypostatic plural unity’. This apparent 
insensitivity to questions of case is concerning.
92 Ibid.
93 Tragediia, 412. Translation my own.
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pervasive as they may appear. One can, for example, see quite clearly from the text that 
surrounds the above example, as well as from other passages in the work, that Bulgakov 
unambiguously makes knowing a function of loving, rather than opposing love and epis-
temology. Likewise, I have already shown how Bulgakov makes clear elsewhere in Tragedy 
that the transcendence of the hypostasis or subject is not that of a zero or ‘limit concept’, in 
a way that negates the attribution of such a transcendence to the subject by Churchyard in 
the passage discussed. But it is not good enough that significant errors of translation can 
be contained and corrected in this way. For in the case of the latter two examples, contra-
dictions are introduced into Bulgakov’s (already difficult) text that are not present in the 
original and that concern some of the work’s central claims. Moreover, in the case of the 
first example discussed, which concerns the proper order of the constituent elements of a 
proposition, such a central claim is simply missed, as the translation creates a distinction 
between kinds of proposition that does not exist in the original. All of these instances, to-
gether with the decision to impose a formal ‘thou’ onto the text without any warrant in the 
Russian, suggest a lack of attention at best and a lack of understanding at worst on the part 
of the translator. Indeed, besides the more egregious instances of error, one gets the impres-
sion at various points in the text of a translation done in haste. How else could an unnec-
essarily clunky phrase like ‘the underlying rock needed to be significantly exposed to the 
action of the weather’,94 rather than ‘the underlying rock needed to be significantly weath-
ered’, have made it into the final text? In sum, the presence of numerous errors in the 
translation (and I include the use of ‘thou’ as an error, rather than a stylistic choice), in ad-
dition to clearly avoidable flaws in style, mean that I cannot concur with those who have 
endorsed the translation as ‘magnificent’ or ‘careful’. This is a shame, because such a trans-
lation is what The Tragedy of Philosophy deserves.
III
In his articulation of the task of theology, Bulgakov occasionally employs the metaphor 
of translation.95 There is an ‘inevitable influence of contemporary philosophical thought, 
which the dogmatic theologian cannot avoid, a kind of translation into contemporary 
language of the lexicon that was proper to the early church’.96 Theology is translation 
because forms of thought and expression are not impervious to the passage of time. But 
theology is translation, and not arbitrary fabrication, because its object abides and un-
derwrites time, such that although the forms of approach must necessarily be re- made, 
the end of that approach remains the same, guaranteeing a unity of reference across 
varying theological modes. Theology is translation, then, because it is concerned with 
‘expressing religious thought about eternity in time, about the supra- temporal within the 
con- temporary’.97
The translation from ancient to contemporary forms is underwritten by a more pro-
found exercise in translation from the eternal into the temporal, and the initiative for 
such a translation does not rest with the latter. Rather, God performs such a translation 
94 Bulgakov, Tragedy, 26.
95 Even in Tragedy, we find an adjacent description of philosophy as a ‘transcription [. . .] of the motifs of 
triunity’ (23).
96 Sergii Bulgakov, ‘Dogmat i dogmatika’, in Zhivoe Predanie: Pravoslavie v Sovremennosti (Paris: YMCA- 
Press, 1936), 23.
97 Ibid., 21.
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of His own life in the act of creation: ‘that which in God is eternal is revealed for creation 
only in time, and here one truly needs a translation from one language to another’.98 
And the Incarnation is such a translation in time of the Father’s eternal naming of 
Himself in the Son, such that the Name of Jesus names also the Trinity. For the world to 
be the revelation of God is for it to be a translation of the Father’s naming of Himself in 
the Son, of God’s naming of Himself as Trinity, of God’s naming of Himself as Wisdom, 
and this is precisely what is conveyed by Bulgakov’s making the proposition ‘I am A’ 
the fundamental form of created life.
Theology deals with the translation already performed by God. The antinomies of 
self- consciousness and of dogma, the ‘cryptograms’ of the Scriptures, are all such utter-
ances of the eternal in time that the theologian must decipher. But other such utterances 
are the lives of the saints, as translations of the life of Christ and of the Trinity. Such 
lives, like that of Saint Sergii of Radonezh, may be remarkable for their silence, yet ‘si-
lence is the speech of the world to come, and now it is the word of those who already in 
this world have stepped into the one to come’.99 For the theologian, the task is ‘to dress 
that silent, secret word in words, to translate it into our human language, to nourish our 
theology from the source of the knowledge of God’.100 Though Bulgakov was— like so 
many Russians of his generation— given to prolixity, one nonetheless finds in his texts 
a language whose quality is at times not unlike the ‘silent word’ of the saints. To read 
and to translate him, then, is at best to share in the searing, unmaking vision of the 
things of God that was undoubtedly his.
98 Sergii Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2008), 123.
99 Sergii Bulgakov, ‘Blagodatnye zavety prep. Sergiia russkomu bogoslovstvovaniiu’, Put’ 5 (1926): 3- 19 
(3).
100 Ibid.
